CTG Server (AS152194) Hong Kong Host used for hosting Criminal Infrastructure - reveals China's CERT Reports

CTG hosts more of the Silver Fox command-and-control servers in CNCERT's November 2026 notices than the next eleven providers combined. Investment Scam websites were also found to be linked to CTG Server
CTG Server Limited (AS152194), a Hong Kong VPS provider registered in December 2023, is a high-risk network: Spamhaus lists its whole ASN on ASN-DROP, and 74% of the IPv4 space it routes sits inside DROP ranges. It is the single largest host of the Silver Fox (银狐) C2 servers CNCERT disclosed in November 2026.
Criminal infrastructure is concentrated here. 27 of 50 Silver Fox C2 IPs from CNCERT's November 2026 notices and live DNS sit on CTG, including 24 of the 30 Golden Hook (G03) C2s. No other provider hosts more than seven. High confidence.
The abuse is broad, not one campaign. Independent abuse statistics rank CTG first among hosting networks for malware addresses in Q1 2026, and its phishing count rose 1,307% quarter on quarter to 26,537 attacks (Nov 2025 – Jan 2026). High confidence in the figures; moderate in their completeness.
Industry blocklists already treat CTG as hostile. ASN-DROP lists the network; 31 Spamhaus SBL records cover 143,104 of its 193,280 routed addresses. High confidence.
It sits in an IP-leasing web. CTG's address blocks are administered by the same Malaysian consultancy contacts (BGP Consultancy / RackIP Consultancy) as a Cloudbays block inside CTG's own /17 that hosts a Silver Fox C2 and Chinese investment-livestream panels. Moderate confidence that this reflects shared operation rather than a common broker.
Intent is not established. The evidence shows CTG's customers run criminal services at scale and that the network stays listed; it does not prove CTG staff knowingly host them. Treat CTG as a bulletproof-like provider for defensive purposes, not as a proven criminal actor.
Who CTG Server is
CTG Server Limited is a small Hong Kong network with a large footprint in abuse data: about 193,000 routed IPv4 addresses, steady for the past year, reached through major global transit carriers.
Attribute | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Network | AS152194, CTGSERVERLIMITED-AS-AP, Hong Kong | APNIC RDAP |
ASN registered | 22 Dec 2023 | APNIC RDAP |
Registrant contact | CTG Server Limited, +852 3611 0789, [email protected] | APNIC RDAP |
Abuse contact | [email protected] (IRT-CTG-HK, validated 17 Jun 2026) | APNIC RDAP |
Address-block admin contacts | BGP Consultancy Pte Ltd and RackIP Consultancy Pte Ltd administrators, +603 7806 1316 (Malaysia), [email protected] | APNIC RDAP on CTG blocks |
Routed IPv4 (origin AS152194) | 657 prefixes, 193,280 addresses on 20 Nov 2026; 192,512–198,912 across Nov 2025–Nov 2026 | RIPEstat |
Main address blocks | 134.122.128.0/17, 137.220.128.0/17, 112.213.96.0/19, 121.127.224.0/19, 202.61.128.0/19, 118.107.16.0/20, 118.107.32.0/20, 143.92.48.0/20, 14.128.32.0/20 (largest contiguous blocks) | RIPEstat, RDAP |
Geolocation | Tung Chung, Hong Kong (some blocks registered with country JP, e.g. CTG122-128-JP) | IPinfo, RDAP |
Upstream transit (by RIPEstat visibility) | PCCW Global (AS3491), NTT (AS2914), BGP Network Ltd (AS64050), CloudRadium (AS17476), Nearoute (AS51847), Hurricane Electric (AS6939), HKIX route server (AS4635), Photon Link (AS58643), Core-Backbone (AS33891), RETN (AS9002) | RIPEstat neighbours |
Downstream | Shine Telecom (AS63902, Taiwan) | RIPEstat neighbours |
Silver Fox C2 concentration
CTG hosts more of the Silver Fox command-and-control servers in CNCERT's November 2026 notices than the next eleven providers combined.
The CTG C2s are not scattered: six sit in 134.122.155.0/24, three in 134.122.189.0/24 and four in 118.107.44.0/24 and .47.0/24. Censys and Shodan show the same build on most of them: Windows Server 2019, RDP on TCP 23389 with a default hostname certificate, WinRM on 5985 and 47001, and SMB on 445. Three had the G03 C2 port (TCP 7777) open in late-October and early-November scans.
Beyond Silver Fox - Phishing, Gambling and Investment scam
Silver Fox is the best-documented tenant, but CTG space also carries mass phishing, commodity malware, illegal gambling and crypto-fraud infrastructure.
Activity | Evidence | Period | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Illegal gambling | 118.107.43.236, a CNCERT-listed Silver Fox C2 (613 bots a day), serves a “澳门新六合彩” (Macau Mark Six lottery) page on port 80 and an open directory on 443 | Nov 2026 | Shodan, Censys |
Crypto-themed domains | USDT and crypto-ETF lure domains resolved to IPs now used as G03 C2s, e.g. usdt88888.com on 134.122.155.14 (Nov 2024) and fulibao.cc on 118.107.44.226 (Feb 2026) | 2024–2026 | Passive DNS reported by a second analysis; not independently re-verified |
Investment-fraud panels (adjacent) | Chinese investment-livestream panels (live.yuanhsiang.cc, stream.keruicapital.net) on 137.220.155.13, a /24 inside CTG's 137.220.128.0/17 routed by AS4907 | Nov 2026 | Censys, host.io |
The gambling host and the investment panels share servers with Silver Fox C2, so the same customers appear to run fraud fronts and RAT infrastructure side by side.
The abuse statistics are counts of reported URLs and domains mapped to CTG addresses; they measure what reached blocklists, not intent, and may double-count fast-rotating phishing kits.
Reputation
Spamhaus treats CTG as a hostile network: AS152194 is on ASN-DROP, the list of networks Spamhaus advises dropping outright, and 31 separate SBL records cover its address blocks.
[embed: node/1e7f138f-822d]
Every one of CTG's large blocks (134.122, 137.220, 202.61, 118.107, 27.124, 112.213 and 143.92) is fully inside DROP. The unlisted remainder sits mainly in 121.127.224.0/19 and a tail of small blocks. Of the 27 CTG addresses tied to Silver Fox below, 26 are inside a DROP range, and all 25 checked against the ZEN DNSBL are on SBL.
Why criminals use CTG
Assessment: CTG suits Chinese-speaking crime groups because it sells cheap Windows servers close to mainland China, outside mainland jurisdiction, and abusive servers stay online for weeks after public exposure.
- Windows servers fit the tooling. Gh0st, Winos and ValleyRAT controllers are Windows desktop programs. The CTG C2s are Windows Server 2019 images with RDP and WinRM open, which is what an operator needs to run them remotely.
- Location. Hong Kong gives low latency to victims in mainland China, the main G03 target set, while sitting outside the mainland's direct enforcement reach.
- Slow takedown. C2 domains CNCERT published on 10 Nov 2026 still resolved to CTG servers on 20 Nov, and those servers still answered on RDP and WinRM in scans from 12–19 Nov. Spamhaus records covering CTG ranges have accumulated to 31 without the space leaving service.
- Cheap re-homing. Operators recycle neighbouring addresses in the same /24s (for example, 134.122.155.0/24 holds six G03 C2s), and CTG blocks are administered through IP-leasing consultancies, so fresh addresses are easy to obtain.
- Reachability despite blocklists. Tier-1 and regional carriers (PCCW Global, NTT, Hurricane Electric and others) still carry CTG routes, so DROP only protects networks that apply it.
Limits. No evidence was found of CTG advertising abuse-tolerant (“bulletproof”) hosting, and its response to abuse reports was not tested for this article. A provider with weak customer vetting and slow abuse handling would produce the same picture as a complicit one.
Fingerprint and hunting
CTG-hosted Silver Fox controllers share a recognisable build: a Windows Server 2019 image, RDP moved to TCP 23389 with a default hostname in its certificate, and remote management left open. That makes new servers findable before they appear in an advisory.
Trait | Seen on | Notes |
|---|---|---|
RDP on TCP 23389, certificate CN WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX or DESKTOP-XXXXXXX | 18 of 24 G03 C2s on CTG | Strongest trait; the default RDP port 3389 is rarely open |
Repeated hostnames across IPs | WIN-MFJLAGB4NUL on 134.122.189.27 and .31; WIN-MGUGT8EP42A on 143.92.40.243 and .244 | Cloned VM image; pivot on the CN |
WinRM 5985 and 47001, SMB 445, WSD 5357 | Most G03 C2s | Default Windows Server exposure |
Raw TCP C2 port with empty banner (7777 for G03) | 134.122.129.33, 134.122.155.140, 143.92.40.155 | Silent until the implant sends one byte (y or z) |
Hunting queries. Censys search needs an organisation account through the API, so run these in the web interface; the Shodan form costs query credits.
# Censys (web interface) host.autonomous_system.asn = 152194 and host.services.port = 23389 and host.services.protocol = "RDP" host.services.cert.parsed.subject_dn = "CN=WIN-MGUGT8EP42A" # Shodan asn:AS152194 port:23389 asn:AS152194 port:5985 os:"Windows Server 2019"
A plain asn:AS152194 port:7777 search returns about 146 mostly web servers, so it is too broad on its own. Combine the CTG ASN with the RDP-23389 trait, then check each hit for an empty-banner high port.
Defenders should look for any outbound RDP to TCP 23389 on AS152194, any connection from an internal host to a high, non-web port on AS152194, and DNS answers that resolve to CTG prefixes for newly registered .vip, .cfd or look-alike brand domains.
Recommendations
The cheapest effective control is a network-level policy on AS152194; the rest is hunting and pressure on the carriers that keep it reachable.
Audience | Action |
|---|---|
Enterprise and government networks | Apply Spamhaus DROP and ASN-DROP at the edge. Where there is no business need, deny inbound and outbound traffic to AS152194, or at least alert on it |
SOC and threat hunters | Search 90 days of firewall, proxy and DNS logs for any contact with CTG prefixes; prioritise RDP to 23389, high non-web ports, and endpoints that also show the SystemKKfile Run key |
CTG Server and its address administrators | Act on reports to [email protected] and [email protected]; suspend the 27 C2 servers listed below and the 23389-RDP fleet that matches them |
Investigators | Use CTG and IP-broker records (customer identity, payment, login IPs) via legal process; the shared admin contacts link CTG and Cloudbays address space |
Indicators
27 CTG addresses tied to Silver Fox activity in November 2026; 26 sit inside a Spamhaus DROP range. The RDP certificate name identifies each server's VM image and is the best pivot for finding siblings.
ip,source,role,rdp_cert_cn,spamhaus_drop
134.122.129.33,CNCERT G03,G03 C2 (TCP 7777 open),WIN-9MB9SB8PPET,SBL657510
134.122.155.140,CNCERT G03,G03 C2 (TCP 7777 open),WIN-J4EVE7KVG21,SBL657510
143.92.40.155,CNCERT G03,G03 C2 (TCP 7777 open),DESKTOP-IGI2IEL,SBL654967
134.122.189.47,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,SBL657510
143.92.40.243,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-MGUGT8EP42A,SBL654967
134.122.155.157,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-Q4FTU4R1A1Q,SBL657510
118.107.44.141,CNCERT G03,G03 C2 (RDP on 25637),WIN-STF74K116NG,SBL687374
134.122.204.118,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,DESKTOP-L46FAV6,SBL657510
134.122.200.118,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-HIAT773LEHN,SBL657510
134.122.155.105,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-6KEHL01LJAA,SBL657510
118.107.47.92,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,DESKTOP-MM83SR7,SBL687374
134.122.204.71,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-4SC9GJFRDBU,SBL657510
134.122.129.44,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,DESKTOP-KFV6AEV,SBL657510
134.122.189.31,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-MFJLAGB4NUL,SBL657510
1.32.250.70,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,DESKTOP-U90R4A4,
134.122.155.16,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,SBL657510
143.92.40.244,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-MGUGT8EP42A,SBL654967
118.107.44.226,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-6Q86NP8OVDS,SBL687374
143.92.43.162,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,DESKTOP-UFDN5EA,SBL654967
134.122.155.14,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,SBL657510
134.122.155.150,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,SBL657510
143.92.37.202,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,SBL654967
134.122.189.27,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,WIN-MFJLAGB4NUL,SBL657510
118.107.44.15,CNCERT G03,G03 C2,DESKTOP-BTQF4HR,SBL687374
118.107.43.236,CNCERT list 8,list-8 C2 and Macau Mark Six gambling page,SBL687374
143.92.56.149,host.io history,former address of list-8 C2 domain kk2029uu.org,SBL664725
143.92.58.175,host.io history,former address of list-8 C2 domain kkkkorg.com,SBL664725
C2 domains resolving to these hosts on 20 Nov 2026 include *.sxkj999.vip (11 subdomains), tj.edatonee.com, www.khop112.cfd, four.x517l.com and hk3.1984233.xyz.
Method, confidence and sources
All collection was passive on 20 Nov 2026: registry, routing and blocklist data, commercial scan databases and public reporting. No CTG host was contacted.
- Routing and registration: RIPEstat (announced prefixes, sampled at six dates Nov 2025 – Nov 2026; neighbours) and APNIC RDAP (ASN, address blocks, contact handles).
- Blocklists: Spamhaus DROP and ASN-DROP files downloaded 20 Nov 2026, intersected with CTG's announced prefixes; Spamhaus ZEN DNSBL for individual IPs.
- Host data: Censys Platform and Shodan host lookups, IPinfo geolocation, host.io DNS history, live DNS.
- Campaign attribution: CNCERT notices of 2 and 10 Nov 2026, enriched in the companion report Silver Fox (银狐) Threat Report, CNCERT Nov 2026 Alerts, Enriched.
- Not used: internal case registries and unverified passive DNS from a second automated analysis, except where marked.
Confidence. High that CTG hosts a large, persistent share of Silver Fox C2 and is treated as hostile by Spamhaus. Moderate that the shared BGP Consultancy / RackIP contacts indicate common operation with Cloudbays rather than a shared broker. Low on CTG's intent, which no source here establishes.
References
- CNCERT, “银狐”木马“金钩(G03)”团伙攻击态势深入分析报告, 10 Nov 2026
- CNCERT / CCTGA, “银狐”木马专项, 恶意域名及恶意IP(八), 2 Nov 2026
- Spamhaus, DROP and ASN-DROP lists
- RIPEstat, AS152194 announced prefixes
- APNIC, RDAP for AS152194